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FEDERAL REMEDIAL SANCTIONS: FOCUS ON TITLE Vilt
SONIA PRESSMAN FUENTES*
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years the movement for women's rights has come
to the fore as a matter of national concern. American women in increas-
ing numbers are joining organizations to fight for equality, engaging in
consciousness-raising sessions, writing magazine articles and books about
sex discrimination and participating in protests, picketing and strikes.
In the midst of all these activities to secure equal rights, women may
tend to forget, or perhaps they never knew, the rights which they have
already won.
Prior to 1963, when Congress passed the Equal Pay Act,1 there
was no federal legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sex. The
following year Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19642 which, among other things, prohibited sex discrimination in
employment. The passage of those statutes and the resulting movement
for women's rights triggered additional legislative and executive action
on both the federal and state levels.' As a result, there is today an
entire panoply of remedies available to the individual who believes
he is the victim of sex discrimination in employment.
It is vital that women recognize the rights which they have gained
since 1963 in order that they may direct their future efforts to policing
the enforcement of those rights by appropriate agencies and securing
additional legislation where needed.
t Copyright 1971 by Sonia Pressman Fuentes.
* Director, Legislative Counsel Division of the Office of the General Counsel, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The views herein expressed, based on informa-
tion available to the public, are solely those of the author and do not necessarily consti-
tute the policy or opinion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
3. Although this article focuses on federal remedies, fair employment practice
commissions at both the state and municipal levels and state agencies which administer
state equal pay legislation can serve as additional sources of relief in cases of sex dis-
crimination. Moreover, some state and local laws and ordinances such as the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Act; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964), as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 952-62.1 (Supp. 1971) ; the New York State Human Rights Law;
N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney Supp. 1971); the Montana Fair Employment
Practices Act; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-301 to -03 (Repl. 1970) ; Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Fair Employment Practices Ordinance 75, as amended, Ordinance 395, July 7, 1969, and
the West Virginia Human Rights Act; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-1 et seq. (Supp.
1970), go beyond existing federal legislation and prohibit sex discrimination in housing,
education and/or places of public accommodation.
Fuentes: Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus on Title VII
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
FEDERAL REMEDIAL SANCTIONS
FEDERAL STATUTES, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND AGENCIES
The principal statutes, executive orders and agencies that are avail-
able to provide relief in cases of employment discrimination based on
sex may be summarized as follows:
1. The Equal Pay Act, which became generally effective in 1964,
is administered by the Wage-Hour Administration in the Department
of Labor.' The Act requires the payment of equal salaries and wages
for equal work. The Equal Pay Act has an advantage over Title VII
in that the Wage-Hour Administrator has the authority to secure en-
forcement of violations in the courts whereas under Title VII the
principal burden for securing enforcement rests on the aggrieved person.
The Equal Pay Act, however, excludes from coverage administrative,
professional and executive employees, and no such exclusions appear
in Title VII.L
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' which became effec-
tive on July 2, 1965, is administered by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the EEOC" or "the
Commission"). It prohibits discrimination by employers, employment
agencies and labor unions based on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin."
Relief under Title VII can be sought through both the EEOC and
the Department of Justice. Whereas the Commission processes charges
through conciliation, the Attorney General is authorized to institute
a lawsuit whenever he has "reasonable cause to believe that any person
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964). The Interpretive Bulletin of the Equal Pay Act
appears at 29 C.F.R. §§ 800 et seq. (1970).
5. In 1970, legislation was introduced which would have removed these exemptions
from the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1970). These
bills, however, were not passed.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964). The Commission's regulations, including
Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, appear at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600 et seq. (1970).
7. The Act covers employers with 25 or more employees, employment agencies
which procure employees for an employer and labor unions which maintain a hiring hall
or have 25 or more members. While many of the principles discussed herein are phrased
in terms of employer violations, similar principles are applicable to conduct by employ-
ment agencies and unions. In addition, employment agencies and unions are prohibited
from discriminating with regard to referrals for employment, and unions are prohibited
from discriminating with regard to membership. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1970) deals spe-
cifically with the responsibilities of employment agencies with regard to sex discrimina-
tion.
When a charge is filed with the EEOC and voluntary compliance is not achieved,
an aggrieved person has the right to institute suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e) (1964). It may be possible that the courts will extend the benefits of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 to cases involving sex discrimination in employment, thereby permitting the institu-
tion of the suit absent the filing of an EEOC charge.
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or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by" Title VII. s
Title VII excludes from coverage instrumentalities of the federal,
state or municipal governments except for the United States Employ-
ment Service and the system of state and local employment services
receiving federal assistance. Thus, teachers in public schools and in
federal and state colleges and universities, policewomen and women in
the military services are among those who are excluded. The exemption
of educational institutions with respect to the employment of individuals
to perform work connected with the educational activities of such in-
stitutions' excludes teachers and administrative personnel in private
schools." Bills to amend Title VII to eliminate these exemptions have
been introduced in the Congress, but none have been passed to date."'
3. Executive Order 11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375,"
effective October 13, 1968, is administered by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (hereinafter referred to as "the OFCC") in the
Department of Labor. It prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin by federal government contractors and
subcontractors and on federally-assisted construction contracts. Under
the Order, government contractors are required to develop and imple-
ment written affirmative action programs to eliminate sex discrimination
or face the cancellation or future loss of government contracts. On
June 9, 1970, the OFCC published interpretations of the affirmative
action requirements in the area of sex discrimination.'
Since 1970, the OFCC has been engaged in processing charges
filed by women's organizations alleging sex discrimination by educational
institutions. Such institutions come within the coverage of the Executive
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). The Attorney General may institute a suit
whether or not a charge has previously been filed with the EEOC. Pursuant to section
706(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), the Attorney General may also, in the dis-
cretion of the court, intervene in civil actions brought by charging parties "if he certifies
that the case is of general public importance."
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964). Discrimination in the employment of teachers and
administrative personnel by both public and private educational institutions may, how-
ever, come within the jurisdiction of the OFCC where the institution involved is a gov-
ernment contractor. See notes 12-15 infra and accompanying text.
10. The section 702 exception, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, applies only to educational in-
stitutions in their capacities as employers, not as employment agencies. Accordingly, the
activities of a university placement office in advertising, recruiting or referring appli-
cants for employment would come within the coverage of the Act unless the office was
part of an exempt federal or state university.
11. See, e.g., H.R. 18278, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1970).
12. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
13. 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967).
14. 35 Fed. Reg. 8888 (1970).
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Order when they are federal government contractors or subcontractors.15
4. Executive Order 11478,1" issued by President Nixon on August
9, 1969, superseded a similar Order, 11375," r issued by President
Johnson on October 13, 1967. The Order, which is administered by the
Civil Service Commission, prohibits sex discrimination in the executive
agencies of the federal government, in competitive positions in the
legislative and judicial branches and in the government of the District
of Columbia. In implementation of Executive Order 11375, the Civil
Service Commission in October, 1967, established the Federal Women's
Program, which continues under Executive Order 11478.8
5. The National Labor Relations Act, 9 which is administered by
the National Labor Relations Board, could be utilized to a greater
extent than it presently is by victims of sex discrimination. Although
the National Labor Relations Act focuses on collective bargaining and
union activity, the Board has ruled on sex discrimination in a number
of contexts and will undoubtedly issue additional rulings in this area as
the struggle for equality continues to grow. Thus, the Board has indicated
that units based solely on the sexual identity of employees are inappro-
priate,2" that a contract whose seniority provisions discriminate on the
basis of sex would not bar a new election to determine union repre-
sentation2' and that an employer violated the Act when he questioned
an employee with regard to a complaint she had filed with the Labor
Department alleging that the employer's wage rates discriminated on the
basis of sex because the employee's conduct was protected "concerted"
activity.
22
15. As noted above, discrimination in the employment of teachers and administrative
personnel of educational institutions is excluded from the coverage of Title Vii.
16. 3 C.F.R. 133 (1970).
17. 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967).
18. For information on the status of women in the federal government see Press-
man, How Can Women Improve Their Government Job Status?, GOOD GOVERNMENT, Fall,
1970, at 8 (published by the National Civil Service League) ; Stafford, Women on the
March Again-Are They Being Discriminated Against in White-Collar Federal Jobs?,
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, June, 1969, at 55. See also CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, STUDY OF
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN T14E FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1968 (1969) ; CIVIL SERVICE
COMM'N, STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1967 (1968) ;
CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, CHANGING PATTERNS, A REPORT ON THE 1969 FEDERAL WOMEN'S
PROGRAM REVIEW SEMINAR (1969) ; Harrison, The Working Woman: Barriers in Em-
ployment, 24 PUB. ADM. REV. 78 (1964).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1964).
20. United States Baking Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 951 (1967) ; Cuneo Eastern Press, Inc.,
106 N.L.R.B. 343 (1953). For a discussion of earlier Labor Board decisions holding
that units based on sex are inappropriate see Note, Sex Discrimination in Employmenlt
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 VAND. L. REV. 484, 487 n.24 (1968).
21. St. Louis Cordage Mills, 168 N.L.R.B. 981 (1967).
22. Montgomery Ward & Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 7 (1965). For a case where sex dis-
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Furthermore, the Board has established a number of principles with
regard to discrimination based on race and national origin which would
appear to be equally applicable to sex discrimination.2" Thus, the Board
has considered the effect of racial appeals on Board-conducted elections. 4
It has stated that a union which causes or permits discrimination
against employers because of race or for other "invidious reasons"
violates its duty to represent all members in the unit fairly, " that a
union's refusal to pursue the grievance and arbitration procedure for
reasons of race violates the Act" and that racial discrimination by the
statutory bargaining representative requires revocation of the union's
certification.27
A recent case arising under the Labor Act with significant implica-
tions for women is United Packinghouse Union v. NLRB,"8 the first deci-
sion under the Labor Act finding that discrimination based on race and
national origin by an employer constitutes a violation of the Act. It re-
mains to be seen whether women will use the rationale of the United
Packinghouse case and the mechanism of the Labor Board to secure re-
dress in cases of employment discrimination.29
crimination in wages resulted in a refusal to bargain charge under the Labor Relations
Act and a suit under the Equal Pay Act. see Midwest Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 19
(1970); Wirtz v. Midwest Mfg. Corp., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 556 (S.D. Ill. 1968).
23. See Kanowitz, Se.r-Based Discrimination in American Late III: Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 320 n.75
(1968).
24. Leading cases in this area are Setuell Mfg. Co.. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962), and
Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
25. Local 568, Teamsters v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967): NLRB v. Local
1367. Longshoremen, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Local 12, United Rubber Workers
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (although the case involved a practice of main-
taining separate seniority groups based on sex as well as race, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 329, the
separation of seniority groups by sex was not raised as an issue) ; Hughes Tool Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) ; Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
26. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). See
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
27. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
28. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), remanding 169 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). The court found that such discrimination frustrates the pos-
sibility of effective concerted action; that it "inevitably sets group against group," there-
by decreasing the possibility of "joint action against their common employer ;" that such
discrimination induces "docility" in the discriminated group; that such "docility" stems
from a number of factors-"fear, ignorance of rights, and a feeling of low self-esteem
engendered by repeated second class treatment ;" that discrimination results in "degrada-
tion, disillusionment, lack of motivation, and lessening of incentive to improve;" that
studies of discrimination point to its "psychologically debilitating effects," and its induce-
ment in the victims of ' self-hatred . . . a feeling of inferiority and lack of motivation
to assert themselves to change their condition." Id. at 1135-37. It appears clear that
this rationale is at least equally applicable to employer discrimination based on sex.
29. In addition, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A.
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RULINGS OF THE EEOC AND THE COURTS UNDER TITLE VIP*
The EEOC is the agency with the longest experience on the federal
level in enforcing a statute which prohibits discrimination based on sex
in all terms, conditions and privileges of employment. The rulings of
the EEOC and the courts under Title VII frequently establish the
principles which are then followed by other agencies on both the federal
and state levels. For these reasons, the remainder of this article will
focus on Title VII. The issues reviewed, however, are those which arise
in cases of sex discrimination whether filed with the EEOC or one of the
other agencies discussed above.
Charges of sex discrimination represent the second largest category
of employment discrimination cases filed with the EEOC.8 ' From July
2, 1965, through December 31, 1970, the first five and one half years
of the EEOC's operation, complaining parties filed about 75,000 charges
of discrimination. 2 About twenty percent of these charges, approxi-
mately 16,000 charges, involved allegations of discrimination based on
sex." Most of these charges involved allegations of discriminatory terms,
conditions and privileges of employment rather than refusal to hire. While
the predominant number of these charges have been filed by women, a
§§ 621 et seq. (Supp. 1971), which does not deal with sex discrimination, may be of
particular use to women over 40 who wish to return to the labor market or change jobs.
The Act, which is administered by the Department of Labor, prohibits age discrirnina-
tion between the ages of 40 and 65.
30. See also Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal En-
forcement of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. U.L R.v. 326 (1971).
31. Charges of race discrimination represent the Commission's largest category of
cases, followed by charges of discrimination based on sex, national origin and religion.
32. Statistics on Charges
(first half)
FISCAL YEAR 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 TOTAL
TOTAL CHARGES 6,026 8,512 11,172 14,471 17,903 16,470 74,554
CHARGES OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 2,031 2,003 2,410 2,689 3,597 3,350 16,080
33. The twenty percent figure is a nationwide figure covering the five and one half
year period. In some of the Commission's field offices, the percentage of sex discrimina-
tion charges runs as high as forty or sixty percent.
The Commission's statistics, which are published in its Annual Reports, do not con-
tain a breakdown of the number of charges involving two forms of discrimination, i.e.,
race and sex or national origin and sex. Black and other minority group women are,
however, frequently the victims of two forms of discrimination: that based on race or
national origin and that based on sex. The effect of this double discrimination is re-
vealed by the median wage or salary income of black women which is considerably below
that of black men and white women. Pressman, lob Discrimination and the Black Wo-
man, CRISIS, March, 1970, at 103. See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th
Cir. 1971), afrg in part & vacating in part 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
37919071]
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number of significant issues have been raised in charges filed by men.
Charges filed by men have involved a refusal to employ because of draft
status and the maintenance of policies with regard to job classifications,
seniority, wage and pay scales, shift assignments, rest periods, restrictions
on the length and style of hair, retirement and pension plans and other
conditions of employment which discriminate against men."4
The law of employment discrimination based on sex is so new that
the articulation of legal principles is just beginning. The EEOC and
the courts have, however, issued a number of significant rulings to date
on substantive questions of law. A discussion of the principal problem
areas and the status of the law in those areas follows.
Job Classification and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ)
The EEOC has stated that, as a general rule, employers may not
maintain separate job classifications based on sex. 5 Title VII does,
however, permit the hiring of members of one sex "in those certain
instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of a particular business
or enterprise.' 6
While "bona fide occupational qualification" is an esoteric term,
its meaning and its consequences become clear when one translates it
into everyday terms. A finding that sex is a BFOQ for a job permits
an employer to lawfully close that job to all members of one sex.
In interpreting the BFOQ exception, the EEOC has found that
those jobs for which sex is a BFOQ are rare indeed." Individuals may
not be refused employment because of assumptions or stereotypes about
members of their sex as a class or because of the preferences of the
34. Among the court decisions involving charges filed by men are Rosen v. Public
Service Elec. & Gas Co., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 1090 (D.N.J. 1970); Diac v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways, Inc., 3 F.E.P. Cas. 337 (5th Cir. 1971); Cook v. Dixie Cup Div. of Amrerican Can
Co.. 274 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Ark. 1967), and Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260
F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tenn. 1966).
35. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1 et seq. (1970).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-2(e) (1964).
37. The EEOC has indicated that it would find sex to be a BFOQ for reasons of
authenticity or genuineness (actor, actress), community standards of morality or pro-
priety (restroom attendant, lingerie sales clerk) and for jobs in the entertainment in-
dustry for which sex appedl is an essential qualification. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1970);
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, TOWARD JOB EQUALITY FOR WOMEN 5-6
(1969).
The Commission's construction of the BFOQ exception follows the legal
maxim that statutory exemptions, particularly those in remedial legislation such as Title
VII, are to be narrowly construed. The burden of establishing that sex is a BFOQ for
a job rests on the employer, employment agency or union which makes the claim
Fuentes: Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus on Title VII
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employer, co-workers, clients or customers. Thus, an employer may not
refuse to employ women for a job on the ground that the job has
traditionally been held by men,3" requires work with or supervision over
men,"9 involves late-night hours or work in isolated locations,4" or
requires the lifting or carrying of heavy weights or other strenuous
activity.4 1
In the area of the BFOQ provision, early publicity focused on
charges of sex discrimination in the employment of flight cabin attend-
ants, commonly referred to as stewards and stewardesses. Subsequent
to a public hearing, the EEOC issued an Opinion finding that airlines
discriminate on the basis of sex when they refuse to hire males as flight
attendants because the basic duties of the job can be satisfactorily per-
formed by members of both sexes.2 That view was supported by Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc.,43 the first court case on this issue."
The EEOC has also found that the termination or transfer tc
ground work of stewardesses on marriage or on reaching their early
thirties violated the Act because such restrictions were part and
parcel of the airlines' unlawful practice of restricting such jobs to women.
These restrictions had never been applied to stewards or other male
flight personnel, such as pilots, co-pilots and flight engineers, and were
unrelated to satisfactory performance of the job."
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (ii) (1970). See Case No. AL 68-3-243F, 1 CCH EMPL.
PRAC. GUIDE 1 6015, at 4035 (EEOC June 4, 1969).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (iii) (1970).
40. Decision No. 70-382, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 6091, at 4138 (EEOC Dec.
16, 1969).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1970).
42. 33 Fed. Reg. 3361 (1968). Similarly, the Commission found that women can-
not be denied positions as pursers aboard United States merchant marine vessels. Case
No. YNY 9-047, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6010, at 4027 (EEOC May 21, 1969).
Ku.sner v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, No. 37,044 (Cir. Ct., Prince George's County,
Md., 1968), involved a BFOQ although it was not a Title VII proceeding. In that case,
the court ordered the Maryland Racing Commission to issue a jockey's license to Kathy
Kusner after indicating that the prior denial of such a license had been based on sex.
Accord, Rubin v. Florida State Racing Comm'n, No. 6819113 (11th Cir., Dade County,
Fla., 1968), wherein the court issued an alternative writ of mandamus compelling the
Florida State Racing Commission to issue an apprentice jockey's license to the female
petitioner.
43. 3 F.E.P. Cas. 337 (5th Cir. 1971). The court stated that the word "necessary"
contained in the BFOQ exception required the application of a "business necessity test,
not a business convenience test. That is to say, discrimination based on sex is valid only
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively." Id. at 339.
44. The same issue is involved in another pending case wherein the Commission
appears as amicus curiae. Schrichte v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 2 F.E.P. Ca's. 950 (N.D.
Ga. 1970).
45. Dodd v. American Airlines, Inc., 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE % 6001, at 4005
(EEOC June 20, 1968); Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE %
1971]
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The Commission's view that sex is rarely a BFOQ for a job was not
adopted in several district court cases." However, it was adopted
in the first appellate court decision on this subject, Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 7 and has been adopted in all subse-
quent court cases." Weeks established the principle that in order to
rely on the BFOQ exception, an employer has the burden of proving that
he had reasonable cause to believe, i.e., a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and ef-
ficiently the duties of the job involved. In dealing with the company's
contention that women could not be hired on a job which required strenu-
ous physical activity and work alone during late-night hours, the court
said:
Moreover, Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternal-
ism as unduly Victorian and instead vests individual women
with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic
6002, at 4010 (EEOC June 20, 1968) ; Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 1 CCH EMPL.
PRAC. GuIDE 11 6003, at 4015 (EEOC June 20, 1968). There have been a number of court
cases involving a stewardess' right to remain on her job after marriage. Lansdale v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971), vacating 2 F.E.P. Cas. 462
(S.D. Fla. 1969) ; Lansdale v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1970),
rev'g 2 F.E.P. Cas. 462 (S.D. Fla. 1969) ; Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D.
213 (D. Colo. 1970); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill.
1970) ; Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Evenson v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1967).
The Commission has also found that airlines violate Title VII when they refuse to
grant maternity leave to stewardesses. Decision No. 70-600, 1 CCH EMPL. PaAc. GUIDE
ff 6122, at 4217 (EEOC March 5, 1970).
46. Gudbrandson v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967), rev'd in part, 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp. 579 (W.
D. Tenn. 1966); Bowe v. Cologate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967),
rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
47. 408 F2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'g 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967). On
April 19, 1971, the district court awarded plaintiff $30,000 in back pay.
48. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 3 F.E.P. Cas. 337 (5th Cir. 1971);
Bowe v. Cologate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g 272 F. Supp.
332 (S.D. Ind. 1967) ; Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754
(M.D. Ala. 1969) (involving the lifting of over 90 pounds). Cheatwood contains an ex-
cellent discussion of medical testimony relevant to weight-lifting.
In Bowe, the court noted that where there are weight-lifting requirements on jobs
it may be helpful to have a job study performed to analyze these requirements and then
classify the jobs according to the degree of strength and stamina required. Employees
would then be given an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity at different levels and
to bid on those jobs at or below the level at which they qualified. 416 F.2d at 718 n.7.
Bowe illustrates the fact that attorney's fees may be quite substantial in class actions
filed under Title VII. In the district court proceeding, the court awarded one of the
plaintiffs' attorneys an $11,000 fee and the other a $1,500 fee payable with costs by the
defendant company. For a discussion of the role private attorneys can play in repre-
senting complaining parties in cases of sex discrimination filed under Title VII see
Pressman, Sex Discrimination in Employment and What You Can Do About It, 54
WOMEN LAw. J. 6 (1968).
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tasks. Men have always had the right to decide whether the in-
cremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous,
obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle.
The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on
an equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including the
bona fide occupational qualification exception Congress intended
to renege on that promise.' °
Sex-Oriented State Employment Legislation
The EEOC issued a number of regulations on the relationship
between Title VII and sex-oriented state employment legislation.5" These
state laws prohibit the employment of women in certain occupations such
as mining 1 and bartending, " limit their hours of work 3 and the weight
they may lift,' require certain benefits for women workers such as
minimum wages," premium pay for overtime,"' rest periods 7 and phys-
49. 408 F.2d at 236.
50. 33 Fed. Reg. 3344 (Feb. 24, 1968); EEOC Policy Statement, Aug. 19, 1966
(unpublished) ; 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (Dec. 2, 1965).
51. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 166 (108) (Recomp. 1958) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-
261 (1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-612 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92-10-2
(1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 93, § 27 (1969) IND. STAT. ANN. § 46-2704 (1965);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 293.060 (1965); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 405 (McKinney 1965); OHIO
REV. CODE § 4107.43 (Baldwin 1964) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 301 (1954) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 103(c) (Supp. 1970) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-22-1 (Supp. 1969) ; VA.
CODE ANN. § 45.1-32 (Repl. 1967) ; WYo. CONST. art. 9, § 3 (1959).
52. ALASKA STAT. § 4.15.090 (1962) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.100 (1970) ; OHIO
REV. CODE § 4107.43 (Baldwin 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 3-8-2 (Supp. 1970).
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (Repl. 1960) : CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1350 et seq.
(West Supp. 1971) ; CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-14-10 (Supp. 1967) ; CONN. GEN.. STAT.
ANN. § 31-12 (Supp. 1970) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-301 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-
1107 (Supp. 1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 5 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-640(1964) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.380 (1969) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332 (1964) ; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 491 et seq. (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art 100, § 52 (Supp.
1970); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 408.59 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.18 (1966) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 6993 (1953) ; Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.040 (1965) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
41-1118 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 609.030 (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:15
(1966) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:2-24 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1969)
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 177 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-17 (Supp. 1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-06 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE § 4107.46 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 81 (1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 103 (Supp. 1970) ; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-3-9 (Repl. 1968); S.D. CoMP. LAWS § 60-12-1 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANn. § 50-718 (Repl. 1966) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5172a, § 1 (1971) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-22-3 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-35 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §
49.28.070 (Supp. 1970); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.02(l) (Supp. 1971); WYo. STAT. ANN.
27-218 (1967).
54. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1250 et seq. (West 1955); OHIO REV. CODE § 4107.43
(Baldwin 1964).
55. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-328 (1971); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1197 (West 1955)
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-7-3 (1963) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 198.2 (1969) ; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-643 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:353 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
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ical facilities,"8 differentiate on the basis of sex with regard to the em-
ployment of minors, and prohibit the employment of women in certain
occupations and industries immediately before and/or after childbirth.
In August, 1969, the Commission issued its current regulation on
the subject, ¢;nding that state laws which restrict the employment of
women are superseded by Title VII and, accordingly, do not justify
the refusal to employ women?9 Federal district courts have as a general
rule adopted the EEOC's approach."0
The view that such state legislation is superseded by Title
VII was implicit in the first Title VII suit filed on the basis of sex by
177.121 (1966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.03 (Baldwin 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
104.02 (1957).
56. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350.5 (West Supp. 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-14-
10 (Supp. 1969) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1107 (Supp. 1969) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-1
(Supp. 1969) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 653.261, 653.265 (1970).
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-609 (Repl. 1960); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.365
(1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 107 (1964) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-218 (1967).
58. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 337 (Recomp. 1958) ; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-261
(1971) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-620 (Repl. 1960) ; CAL. LABOR CODE § 1253 (West 1955)
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-2-13 (1963) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-27 (Supp. 1970);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-310 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-401 (Rev. 1961) ; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 44-1108 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 31.7 (1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-
1006 (Repl. 1965) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-111 (1964) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 338.110
(1969) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 23:293 (1964) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 103 (1965) ;
MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 408.74 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 182.44 (1966); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 292.170 (1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 41-1119 (1947); NE. REV. STAT. §
48-201 (Reissue 1968) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 609.130 (1970) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
277:8 (Repl. 1966); N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:2-29 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-5-11
(Repl. 1953); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 203-b (McKinney 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-29
(1965); OHIO REV. CODE § 4107.42 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 75
(1954) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 653.270 (1970) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 108 (1964) ; R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-21-4 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-256 (1962); S.D. CoMP.
LAws § 60-12-9 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-607 (Repl. 1966); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
art. 5172a (1971) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-22-2 (Supp. 1969) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-34
(1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.220 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-11 (Repl.
1970) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.16 (1957).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1970). In December, 1969, in a case involving the District
of Columbia's maximum hours laws for women (D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-301 (1961)), the
EEOC found that Title VII supersedes prior conflicting federal legislation as well as
conflicting state legislation. Decision No. 70-382, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 1 6091, at
4138 (EEOC Dec. 16, 1969). On March 25, 1970, the Corporation Counsel for the
District of Columbia issued an Opinion adopting the Commission's view, and on Augzst
21, 1970, he issued an additional Opinion finding that Title VII supersedes the District's
restrictions on the employment of minors to the extent it discriminates on the
basis of sex.
60. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 3 F.E.P. Cas. 326 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 3 F.E.P. Cas. 280 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Garneau v.
Raytheon Co., 3 F.E.P. Cas. 215 (D. Mass. 1971); Local 246, Utility Workers v. South-
ern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Richards v. Griffith Rubber
Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969) ; Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp.
1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968) Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill.
1970). The validity of state legislation is also involved in Mengelkoch v. Industrial Wel-
fare Comm'n 437 F2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971), and Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165
(E.D. La. 1968).
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the Department of Justice, United States v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,"'
and in the consent order issued therein. The consent order provided for
bidding into jobs and the assignment of overtime on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis even though Ohio's legislation restricts overtime and weight-
lifting for women.2
Since 1969, the Attorneys General of South Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Oklahoma, Michigan, Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Washington have
issued Opinions finding that Title VII and/or their state fair employ-
ment practices legislation superseded their state legislation restricting the
employment of women." In jurisdictions where no definitive court deci-
sion or Attorney General's Opinion has been issued, employers may find
themselves in a dilemma between the dictates of Title VII and state leg-
islation. In such instances, a suit for a declaratory judgment under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is appropriate."
The Commission's current regulations contain no statement of
position on the relationship between Title VII and state laws which
require benefits for women workers, such as minimum wages, premium
pay for overtime and rest periods."2 The Commission is handling cases
61. 3 E.P.D. 8052 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
62. The view that Title VII supersedes Ohio's restrictions on maximum hours and
weight-lifting for women was also expressed in Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 3
F.E.P. Cas. 280 (S.D. Ohio 1971). In Ridinger the court noted its disagreement with
Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 253 (1971).
On May 3, 1971, in General Electric Iv. Hughes, No. 7922 (S.D. Ohio), the court issued
a preliminary decree enjoining the Ohio Department of Industrial Relations and the
Attorney General from enforcing Ohio's employment laws dealing solely with women
against the plaintiff.
The consent order in Libbey-Owens is also significant as an example of the type of
relief which may be appropriate in a case involving sex discrimination. The agreement
provided, among other things, that the company and union would implement an education
and training program for women employees to assist them in transferring to new jobs
and departments and that the company, when hiring, would take positive steps, includ-
ing advertising, to ensure that its file of pending applications included a sufficient
number of applications from women so that it could hire on a nondiscriminatory basis,
and that, to the extent qualified women employees were available, two of the next four
foremen in certain departments would be women.
63. Cf. Opinion of the Attorney General of North Dakota, CCH LAB. L. REP.
49,995.02 (April 18, 1969). Furthermore, since the effective date of Title VII, many
states and the District of Columbia have amended or repealed their legislation
which will effectively broaden opportunities for women. Most of these changes are de-
tailed in TASK FORCE ON LABOR STANDARDS, REPORT TO THE CITIZENS' ADvISORY COUNCIL
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 56-68 (1968).
64. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
65. In its previous regulation, the EEOC had ,stated that
an employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice
if he refuses to employ or promote a woman in order to avoid providing a bene-
fit for her required by law-such as minimum wage or premium overtime pay.
33 Fed. Reg. 3344 (1968) ; 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (1965).
1971]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1971], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss2/6
386 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
raising such issues on a case-by-case basis. It would appear, however,
that the existence of such laws will not justify the refusal to hire or
promote women. Furthermore, such laws may be harmonized with Title
VII by extending the benefits involved to men. That was the view
expressed in Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays,6 wherein the Commission
participated as amicus curiae. In Potlatch, an employer sought a declara-
tory judgment that Arkansas law requiring overtime pay for women!
was superseded by Title VII. The court found instead that there was
no conflict between Title VII and Arkansas law because the employer
could comply with both statutes by paying both men and women the
overtime rate which the state required for women."
Classified Advertising
The Commission has long ruled that an advertiser may not indicate
a preference or limitation based on sex in the content of classified ad-
vertising unless sex is a BFOQ for the job involved. The Commission's
position with regard to advertising placed in sex-segregated advertising
columns underwent various changes until its final ruling which became
effective on January 24, 1969:
It is a violation of Title VII for a help-wanted advertisement
to indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimina-
tion based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification for the particular job involved. The placement of
an advertisement in columns classified by publishers on the
basis of sex, such as columns headed "Male" or "Female," will
66. 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970). In Ridinger v. General Motors Corp.,
3 F.E.P. Cas. 280 (S.D. Ohio 1971), the court ruled that Title VII superseded Ohio law
which prohibited the employment of women for more that five continuous hours without
a 30 minute meal period, but found ho conflict with Ohio law requiring seats for female
employees and special provisions for lunchbreaks. In Burns v. Rohr Corp., No. 69-132-S,
pending in the Southern District of California, the male plaintiff alleges that the com-
pany's refusal to provide rest periods for men such as are provided for women pursuant
to California law violates Title VII. The EEOC's position is stated in its regulations:
The fact that the employer may have to provide separate facilities for a person
of the opposite sex will not justify discrimination under the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification exception unless the expense would be clearly unreasonable.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(iv) (1970).
67. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (Repl. 1960).
68. The EEOC's regulations are also silent with regard to the relationship between
Title VII and state legislation which differentiates on the basis of sex in regu-
lating the employment of minors. There has been, however, an Opinion by the Corpora-
tion Counsel for the District of Columbia finding that the District's act regulating the
employment of minors is superseded by Title VII to the extent that it discriminates on
the basis of sex. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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be considered an expression of a preference, limitation, specifica-
tion, or discrimination based on sex.69
In spite of this ruling, newspapers are replete with advertisements which
are placed in sex-segregated columns and contain unlawful sex pre-
ferences. There are a number of reasons for this. A suit filed by the
American Newspaper Publishers Association and the Washington, D.C.
Evening Star attacking the EEOC's proposed regulation concerning
sex-segregated advertising columns delayed the effective date of the
regulation" and caused confusion in the public mind as to its validity.
That suit was dismissed on October 22, 1970. Secondly, relatively few
charges have been filed attacking discriminatory classified advertising,
apparently because the question of who has standing to file such charges
has not yet been resolved in a court case. It would appear that anyone
who has applied for the job advertised or is interested in applying for it,
as well as an incumbent employee, would have standing to attack such
advertising. It may also be found that anyone in the labor force who
reads the advertisement has such standing.
A third reason for the continued existence of sex discrimination
in classified advertising is the fact that newspapers' responsibility for
such discrimination remains in litigation. In its amicus curiae brief
in Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co.,7 the Commission
took the position that a newspaper which maintained classified advertising
columns was acting as an employment agency and therefore came within
the ambit of the Act. That position was not sustained by the district
court, and the case is currently pending on appeal.
There have been, however, numerous developments involving sex-
segregated advertising columns through recourse to city and state fair
employment practice commissions which have clear jurisdiction over
newspapers through municipal ordinances and state statutes. After
charges were filed with the New York City Fair Employment Practices
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4 (1970). The regulation is based on section 704(b) of Title
VII which prohibits employers, unions and employment agencies from printing or pub-
lishing discriminatory advertising relating to employment or referral for employment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1964).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4, first announced in August, 1968, was scheduled to become
effective on December 1, 1968. 33 Fed. Reg. 11539 (Aug. 14, 1968). The Publishers
Association suit and the appeal from the district court's decision therein initially delayed
the effective date of the Regulation. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alex-
ander, 294 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1968). Thereafter, the appellate court permitted the
Regulation to become effective on January 24, 1969, even though the litigation was still
pending. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 1
9203 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71. 315 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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Commission, the New York Times and all major New York City
newspapers desegregated their advertising columns on December 1,
1968.72 Similar charges were filed with the Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations involving the Pittsburgh Press.7 On March 24, 1971,
in the first state court decision on the issue, the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas affirmed the decision of the Pittsburgh Commission, find-
ing that the Pittsburgh Press was in violation of the Pittsburgh ordin-
ance by maintaining sex-segregated advertising columns.7" On January
18, 1971, the three major newspapers in the District of Columbia deseg-
regated their classified advertising columns pursuant to an agreement
reached with the District's Human Relations Commission.75
Terms, Conditions and Privileges of Employment
Wages and Salaries
As a general rule, equal terms, conditions and privileges of employ-
ment must be made available for men and women."6 Thus, employees
are entitled to equality with regard to wages and salaries. Title VII
covers both the obvious type of discrimination where men and women
in the same job classification are receiving disparate wages or salaries
and the more subtle type where only women are employed in a job
classification and the wage rate is discriminatorily depressed because only
women have traditionally been employed in that classification."7
Seniority
Title VII prohibits the establishment or maintenance of seniority
lists or lines of progression based on sex."' Where plant-wide seniority
72. See 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 11 26,175, at 8901.
73. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Press, Decision No. 558
(Pittsburgh Pa., Comm'n on Human Rights, July 23, 1970).
74. 3 E.P.D. 8154 (Pa. C.P. 1071), construing PIrr URGH, PA., ORDINANCE No.
75, § 8(e). See 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 5093, at 3815.
75. See D.C. POLICE REGULATIONS, art. 47, § 4(d).
76. The Commission has found, for example, that a bank's policy of permitting
male employees to smoke at their desks while female employees could smoke only in em-
ployee lounges violated Title VII. Decision No. 71-109, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GuIDE 1
6165, at 4277 (EEOC July 29, 1970).
77. Such discrimination can be ascertained by comparing the wages of these women
with the wages of men doing comparable work in the company involved or men doing
the same work at other plants in the industry.
78. The placement of jobs in a line of progression may constitute sex discrimina-
tion where such placement has a disproportionate impact on women and is not war-
ranted by business necessity. Thus, the Commission found unlawful an employer's place-
ment in a line of progression of two job classifications that involved the lifting of heavy
weights but did not involve the acquisition of any skills needed to perform jobs higher
in the line of progression. Decision No. 71-865, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6190, at
4323 (EEOC Dec. 23, 1970). For a case wherein backpay was awarded and a pre-
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has been in effect, it may be possible to correct a segregated seniority
system merely by integrating the system. However, where departmental,
gang or job seniority is a factor in determining transfers and promotions,
additional adjustments in the system may be needed to eliminate the
effects of past discrimination. Otherwise, women with long years of
plant service will remain excluded from certain jobs, gangs and depart-
ments."9
Marital and Family Status
The EEOC has said that an employer may not refuse to hire
married women or women with children, legitimate or illegitimate, s" and
may not discharge female employees because of marriage or parenthood
unless it has a similar policy for men."l Contrary to these views, the
liminary injunction issued on remand in connection with a seniority system based on sex,
see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
79. United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 3 E.P.D. 8122 (N.D. Ohio 1970);
Decision No. 71-1062, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE % 6197, at 4331 (EEOC Dec. 30,
1970); Decision No. 71-1100, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 1 6197, at 4333 (EEOC Dec.
31, 1970). Cf. Decision No. 71-413, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. Guim 6204, at 4346 (EEOC
Nov. 5, 1970).
The problems posed in correcting discriminatory seniority systems based on sex are
similar to those posed by racially discriminatory seniority systems. The applicability of
Title VII to racially discriminatory seniority systems has been involved in a number of
cases, including United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969),
re'vg 295 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1968) ; Local 189, United Papermakers & Paper-
workers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), affg 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La.
1968), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 926 (1970) ; Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
80. The Commission has indicated that an employer's policy of refusing employ-
ment to unwed mothers would violate Title VII even assuming, arguendo, that the em-
ployer attempted to apply the same policy to men who fathered illegitimate children:
[B]earing a child out of wedlock is a fact not easily hidden from an employer's
discovery procedures, whereas it's a wise employer indeed that knows which of
its male applicants truthfully answered its illegitimacy inquiry. We note, there-
fore, the foreseeable and certain impact of an illegitimacy standard, even where
an employer attempts to apply it equally, is to deprive females, but not similarly
placed males, of employment opportunities.
Decision No. 71-332, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE % 6164, at 4276 (EEOC Sept. 28, 1970).
Braddy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 70-1187-Civ-CA, pending in the Southern
District of Florida with the Commission as amicus curiae, is a class action wherein the
plaintiff alleges that the respondent discriminates on the basis of sex because of its
refusal to hire unwed mothers.
81. Title VII contains no prohibition against discrimination based on marital or
family status unless it results in sex discrimination. Thus, an employer's refusal to em-
ploy married or single people or husband and wife in the same family for certain jobs
would not constitute per se violations of Title VII. It might, however, be possible to
establish that such policies violate Title VII where it can be shown that they have a
disproportionate effect on women and are not required by business necessity. Civil
Service Commission Regulations, which prohibit discrimination in covered positions in
the federal government, prohibit discrimination based both on sex and marital status.
5 C.F.R. § 713.401 (1970).
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Fifth Circuit in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.12 ruled that an
employer could lawfully refuse to hire women with pre-school age
children although it hired men with such children. The court enunciated
the "sex-plus" doctrine, ruling that an employer violated Title VII if it
discriminated against women ,olely on the basis of their sex; however, if
an employer discriminated against women for two reasons, e.g., sex and
having pre-school age children, such double-pronged discrimination was
lawful. That rationale was repudiated by the Supreme Court when it
vacated the decision and remanded the case on January 25, 1971 :88
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that
persons of like qualification be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred
in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for
women and another for men---each having pre-school age
children."4
Maternity Leave
The Commission has established the principle that, as a general
rule, an employer may not terminate an employee who is compelled to
cease work because of pregnancy without offering her, alternatively, a
82. 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969). Thereafter, one of the members of the court of
appeals petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the court on its own motion withdrew
the opinion. In a 10-3 decision, the court denied the petition for rehearing. 416 F2d
1257 (5th Cir. 1969).
On March 2, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari after an amicus
curiae brief in support of the petition had been filed by the EEOC and the Department
of Justice. 397 U.S. 960 (1970). This was the first time that the Department of Justice
had filed a brief on a matter of substance in a case involving sex discrimination. Phillips
was the first Title VII case argued before the Supreme Court.
83. 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971). The case had been decided below on a motion for sum-
mary judgment; the Supreme Court remanded the case for a fuller development of the
record.
84. The opinion also contained language indicating that the Court believed that jobs
which women were able to perform might lawfully be closed to them if it could be
shown that their obligations toward pre-school age children were "demonstrably more
relevant to job performance" than similar obligations on the part of men. Id. at 498.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stated:
I can not agree with the Court's indication that a "bona fide occupational quali-
fication reasonably necessary to the normal operation of' Martin Marietta's
business could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast ma-
jority, with preschool age children have family responsibilities that interfere
with job performance and that men do not usually have such responsibili-
ties ....
When performance characteristics of an individual are involved, even when
parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may be limited only by
employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.
Id. at 498-99.
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leave of absence with the right of reinstatement to the position vacated
at no loss of seniority or any of the other benefits and privileges of
employment. While the employee is out on maternity leave, the employer
should attempt to keep her job open or filled on a temporary basis."b
The Commission has found that, absent a showing of business necessity,
an employer's conditioning of maternity leave on two years of employ-
ment violated the Act where leaves of absence and disability leaves were
not subject to any similar requirement,"6 that an employer's policy of
granting maternity leave only to married female employees violated the
Act in the absence of a provision for the termination of unmarried fathers,
and that, absent a showing of business necessity, an employer's refusal to
credit an employee for time spent on maternity leave taken prior to the
effective date of the Act constituted an unlawful present effect of past
discrimination."
The first judicial decision involving the employment rights of
expectant mothers under Title VII, Schattman v. Texas Employment
Commission," was issued on February 25, 1971. In Schattman, where-
in the EEOC appeared as amicus curiae, the court ruled that an employer's
policy of requiring employees to cease work at the conclusion of their
seventh month of pregnancy violated Title VII :
By virtue of female physiology, the Defendants' policy applies
solely to women. Women are terminated not because of their
85. Decision No. 71-308, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 6170, at 4286 (EEOC Sept.
17, 1970) ; Case No. LA 68-4-538E, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE f 6125, at 4222 (EEOC
June 16, 1969) ; Decision No. 70-600, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE % 6122, at 4217 (EEOC
Mar. 5, 1970); Decision No. 70-360, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6084, at 4130
(EEOC Dec. 16, 1969). If it is not possible to keep the employee's job open or filled
on a temporary basis, the employer would be justified in replacing her. In such a case,
upon the employee's return to work, the employer should attempt to place her in an equi-
valent position. Where this is not possible, he may be justified in offering her a tempor-
ary job in a lower classification until such time as she can be restored to her original
job. If that is not possible, he may be justified in offering her a permanent position in
a lower job classification. If it is impossible to place the employee in any position upon
her return, fairness might require that she receive preferential consideration for future
openings. The Commission determines whether or not the employer has made a suf-
ficient effort to satisfy the rights of employees returning from maternity leave upon a
review of all the circumstances in each individual case.
86. Decision No. 71-562, 1 CCH EMPI. PRAc. GUIDE 1I 6184, at 4312 (EEOC Dec.
4, 1970).
87. Decision No. 71-413, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6204, at 4346 (EEOC Nov. 5,
1970).
88. 3 F.E.P. Cas. 311 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
89. The defendant's policy, in pertinent part, provided that: "No employee antici-
pating maternity confinement may remain in active service with the [Texas Employment]
Commission later than two months before the expected delivery date." An employee
removed from active service pursuant to the above policy was not automatically granted
leave without pay but might be placed on such leave upon written application' for a
period not to exceed six months which could be extended for an additional six months
upon further application. Id. at 312.
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unwillingness to continue work, their poor performance, or their
need for personal medical safety, but because of a condition
attendant to their sex. This is the very type of discriminatory
regulation condemned by the interpretive regulations of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. . . . This is not
to say that ... [an employer] cannot have such a policy based
on individual medical or job characteristics, but it does mean
that broad policies not so justified are contrary to law.9"
Insurance Coverage
It would appear that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrim-
ination in "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" would require
that job-related insurance plans be equally available to members of
both sexes and that the benefits thereof must be equal for members of
both sexes. These principles, however, have not yet been clearly articulated
under Title VII for a number of reasons. First, the Wage-Hour Ad-
ministrator of the Department of Labor, in interpreting the Equal Pay
Act, has set forth different standards,"' and section 703(h) of Title VII
90. Id. at 311. The court thus adopted the argument made by the EEOC in
its amicus brief that an employment policy which compels employees to resign after
reaching a certain month of pregnancy violates Title VII unless the employer demon-
strates that such a policy is essential to safely and efficiently perform the job involved.
In a subsequent order denying a motion on the grounds that Title VII excludes state
instrumentalities from the definition of "employer," the court noted that state employ-
ment agencies are subject to the Act and that the court had jurisdiction under the provi-
sions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending in the Southern District of Texas with the Commis-
sion as arrmicus curiae is Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, Civil Action No. 70-H-1164,
wherein the plaintiff alleges that the respondent refused to refer her for employment and
declared her ineligible for unemployment benefits because she had reached her sixth
month of pregnancy.
91. The Equal Pay Interpretive Bulletin, section 800.116(d) states as follows:
Contributions to employee benefit plans. If employer contributions to a plan
providing insurance or similar benefits to employees are equal for both men
and women, no wage differential prohibited by the equal pay provisions will
result from such payments, even though the benefits which accrue to the em-
ployees in question are greater for one sex than for the other. The mere fact
that the employer may make unequal contributions for employees of opposite
sexes in such a situation will not, however, be considered to indicate that the
employer's payments are in violation of Section 6(d) [the Equal Pay Act], if
the resulting benefits are equal for such employees.
29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1970). However, section 800.113 states:
Study is still being given to some categories of payments made in connection
with employment subject to the Act, to determine whether and to what extent
such payments are remuneration for employment that must be counted as part
of wages for equal pay purposes. These categories of payments include . . .
contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third person pur-
suant to a bona fide plan for providing old-age, retirement, life, accident, or
health insurance or similar benefits for employees.
29 C.F.R. § 800.113 (1970). Section 800.113 was referred to by the court in footnote 1
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contemplates a relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.92
Secondly, there has to date been no judicial decision on insurance cover-
age under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act."
The EEOC has, however, indicated in Commission decisions that
the following types of employee insurance coverage do not comport with
the requirements of Title VII: a group health insurance plan provided by
an employer at its own expense where hospital and surgical benefits are
available only to the dependents of employees who have "head of house-
hold" status, a status the employer assumes applies to married males but
not married females ;94 an employer's insurance plan that limits the pur-
chase of health insurance covering all dependents and affording maternity
benefits to those employees who have "head of household" status ;" group
insurance plans under which coverage is available for the wives of male
employees but not the husbands of female employees ;"9 and a group health
insurance plan which provides immediate maternity benefits for the wives
of male employees but conditions the eligibility of female employees on
two years of employment."
of Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970), as follow's: "We
note also that it is far from clear that standard types of fringe benefits are eligible for
inclusion in 'equal pay' determinations." See 29 C.F.R. § 800.113 (1970).
92. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29
[the Equal Pay Act].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). In section 1604.7 of its regulations, dealing with
the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, the Commission has stated:
(a) . . . Accordingly, the Commission interprets Section 703(h) to mean that
the standards of "equal pay for equal work" set forth in the Equal Pay Act for
determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to
Title VII....
(b) Accordingly, the Commission will make applicable to equal pay com-
plaints filed under Title VII the relevant interpretations of the Administrator,
Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor. . . . Relevant opinions of
the Administrator interpreting "the equal pay for equal work 'standard" will
also be adopted by the Commission.
93. Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civil Action No. CA 69-211, a sex dis-
crimination case pending in the Northern District of Alabama, involves, among other
things, a pension and insurance agreement effective from 1964 to 1967 under which dis-
abled female employees were paid $10 per week less than disabled male employees.
94. Case No. CL 7-6-694, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE ff 6009, at 4026 (EEOC
May 19, 1969).
95. Decision No. 70-495, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE % 6110, at 4162 (EEOC Jan.
29, 1970). with regard to conditioning the emoluments of employment on "head of house-
hold" status, see 29 C.F.R. § 800.149 (1970).
96. Decision No. 71-1100, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE % 6197, at 4333 (EEOC Dec.
31, 1970); Decision No. 70-660, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE f 6133, at 4232 (EEOC
Mar. 24, 1970); Decision No. 70-510, 1 CCH EMPL. PAc. GUIDE t 6132, at 4231 (EEOC
Feb. 4, 1970).
97. Decision No. 71-1100, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE % 6197, at 4333 (EEOC
Dec. 31, 1970).
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Retirement and Pension Plans
The Commission has made the following pronouncements with
regard to pension and retirement plans :"8
(a) A difference in optional or compulsory retirement
ages based on sex violates Title VII."
(b) Other differences based on sex, such as differences
in benefits for survivors, will be decided by the Commission
by the issuance of Commission decisions in cases raising such
issues.' °
On September 13, 1968, the EEOC's General Counsel issued an
interpretive Opinion dealing with section 1604.31(a) declaring that
women who had an option to retire within five, seven or ten years
after October 1, 1968, under a plan existing on that date which permitted
earlier optional retirement by women, might lawfully be permitted to
exercise such options. 1' The first judicial decision dealing with a retire-
ment and pension plan under Title VII, Rosen v. Public Service Electric
& Gas Co.,' casts doubt on the validity of the Opinion. In Rosen, the
court held that an employer violated Title VII by maintaining a retire-
ment and pension plan which provided for differentials in retirement age
and pension benefits based on sex. The court further held that a revision
of this plan was unlawful even though it eliminated the sex differentials
in the main because it contained an exception for certain incumbent
female employees:
The exception in the . . . amended plan envisions a phasing
out of the discriminatory pension system. Gradual improvement
of employment opportunities does not in and of itself constitute
compliance with Title VII .... A court is not limited to barring
only present and future wrongs but may act to eliminate the
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.31 (1970).
99. Section 1604.31 (a) was followed in Decision No. 70-45, 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE 1 6041, at 4072 (EEOC July 19, 1969); Decision No. 70-75, 1 CCH EMPL. PktAC.
GUIDE 6049, at 4082 (EEOC Aug. 13, 1969); and Case No. YNY9-034, 1 CCH
EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE t 6050, at 4083 (EEOC June 16, 1969).
100. The Commission has found unlawful a pension plan which provides an an-
nuity for widows of employees that is not provided for widowers of employees and a
death benefits plan which provides a mandatory pension for widows of employees but
does not provide a pension for the widowers of employees unless they are physically or
mentally incapable of self-,support and were actually supported in whole or in part by
the deceased employee at the time of her death. Case No. YNY9-034, 1 CCH EMPL
PAc. GUIDE 6050, at 4083 (EEOC June 16, 1969).
101. EEOC General Counsel, Opinion Letter, Sept. 13, 1968.
102. 2 F.E.P. Cas. 1090 (D.N.J. 1970).
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present effects of past discriminations.'
CONCLUSION
As has been illustrated, there is a great deal of law being made
today at the administrative and judicial levels involving women's rights.
This is not to say that the battle has been won on the legal front. The
Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution has not yet been passed.
None of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the excep-
tion of Title VII concern themselves with sex discrimination."0 4 Dis-
crimination based on sex in housing is not a violation of the federal
Fair Housing Act' nor of most state and municipal housing laws. The
Social Security Act still permits differentials in benefits based on sex.'"
Many states are still enforcing legislation which restricts the employment
of women and female minors. Few states provide disability payments to
women employees on maternity leave. Significant categories and numbers
of women are excluded from the protections of Title VII, the Equal Pay
Act and Executive Order 11478. The EEOC under Title VII has no
power to enforce its decisions.'
The articulation of legal protections for women, however, has begun.
Until 196110 a woman who was the victim of sex discrimination in
employment had no legal recourse on either the federal or state level.
Today, there are many agencies to which she can turn for relief. It is
now up to women to move ahead by insuring the implementation of
the legal victories which have been won and by continuing to fight for
those that are yet to be attained. But already women can echo the words
of Martin Luther King:
103. Id. at 1096-97.
104. Those Titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which deal with discrimination
based on race, color, national origin and religion but exclude discrimination based on
sex are:
Title II, Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public Accommoda-
tion.
Title III, Desegregation of Public Facilities.
Title IV, Desegregation of Public Education.
Title V, Commission on Civil Rights.
Title VI, Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs (also excludes dis-
crimination based on religion).
Title VIII, Registration and Voting Statistics (also excludes religion).
Title IX, Intervention and Procedure After Removal in Civil Rights Cases.
Title X, Establishment of Community Relations Service (also excludes discrimina-
tion based on religion).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1964).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
10& The Wisconsin Fair Employment Practices Act, which became effective
August, 1961, was the first such statute to prohibit sex discrimination.
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We ain't what we oughta be,
we ain't what we wanta be,
we ain't what we gonna be,
but thank God we ain't what we was. 9
109. S. DAviS. JR., J. BoYA & B. BoYAR, YEs I CAN (Preface) (Ist ed. 1965).
Fuentes: Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus on Title VII
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
